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A CENTURY AGO, ADMIRAL CHARLES H. STOCKTON prepared a U.S. Naval War Code which was approved by President McKinley in 
June 1900 but was revoked four years later after certain concerns were 
expressed by foreign governments. While it appears that the episode would 
deserve a historical study evaluating the significance of this particular code 
both for training Navy officers at the time and for later similar efforts, the more 
general question of the role of individuals in international humanitarian law 
appears worth being reflected upon in a study honoring Charles Stockton. 
What is the role of individuals in international law? To what extent are 
individuals bearers of international legal rights and obligations? What is their 
role as actors in the progressive development of that law? 
Not surprisingly, different answers to these complex questions have been 
considered over time, and they remain rather controversial. As Karl Josef 
Partsch concluded in 1985, it is difficult to formulate a thesis in this respect 
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which both reflects a general consensus among writers and conforms with State 
practice. He also expressed doubts whether the increased concern for the 
protection of human rights during the last decades has led to a transformation 
of the legal position of the individual.! Indeed, the central role of States as 
sovereign subjects of international law has not changed very much throughout 
this century. But political efforts to ensure protection of the individual and the 
as well as governmental, international organizations 
working to this end have gained considerable influence. It is significant that 
practical aspects in the wider field of human rights and public opinion in many 
quarters have increasingly challenged more traditional views of international 
law as a whole, thus underlining the rights of individuals which all States must 
respect and protect. 
The aims of this study are to describe the role of the individual in the 
ongoing evolution of international humanitarian law as a result of both factual 
and policy developments, assess certain deficiencies of existing conventional 
law, and develop various methodological considerations regarding 
international for military operations. Conclusions to be drawn 
from these thoughts may affect the work of policy makers, legal practitioners, 
and academic lawyers alike. 
Evolution of International Humanitarian Law 
Rights and obligations of individuals their government have been 
postulated since long before our present age. The specific question of whether 
the Sovereign has an international obligation to observe the ordinary laws of 
war even toward rebellious subjects who openly take up arms against him had 
already surfaced by the eighteenth century.2 Individuals were not seen as 
subjects of international law, a role that has been reserved for States since early 
times. But characterizing human beings as pure objects of international law has 
never been a convincing conclusion either. The dichotomy 
appears hardly appropriate in an area where legal protection of individuals is of 
topical importance.3 
The rapid factual development during the present century has added 
additional arguments: national sovereignty is challenged today by the end of 
the Cold War, failed processes of modernization, and burdens 
inherited from colonialism. There is, indeed, a need for global response to 
existing security risks. Acts of terrorism, drug abuse, problems of migration, 
and environmental protection require combined efforts which States today 
cannot successfully perform except in cooperation with other States, 
120 
Dieter Fleck 
international organizations, and even individuals. Challenged to deal with 
security matters in a broader sense, States and societies are called upon to make 
new efforts in order to overcome practical inabilities in the implementation of 
shared principles. New ideas, attitudes, and resources have to be developed 
jointly to ensure economic well,being and to meet environmental risks. The 
challenges of our present information age require long,term attitudes based on 
technological skills not always available within existing State establishments, 
thus calling for increased cooperation between government agencies, private 
companies, and individuals. 
A distinct international interest on the part of national parliaments in a 
growing number of democratic States today very significantly affects effort 
taken on a global scale. Widely shared political concerns (in some States even 
constitutional constraints) are relevant for parliamentary decision,making 
regarding the use of military power. But there is also an increasing role for 
human rights considerations, in calling for responsible action towards gross 
violations in other States. National parliaments are increasingly involved in 
international relations. They pass legislation regulating the sending of their 
military forces abroad and the long,term or shorHerm stationing of foreign 
forces on their own territory. Members of national parliaments participate in 
international conferences and are important interlocutors for official visitors 
from foreign States. Parliamentary debates are often used to articulate a 
political interest in developments within other countries. 
Human rights violations are typical fields of legitimate interference in 
matters of general concern which today cannot be left to the domestic 
jurisdiction of a particular State. State sovereignty at the end of this century is 
no longer the same as it was at its beginning. These trends also reveal evolving 
restraints in State immunity law, restraints which deserve thorough evaluation 
from both national and international legal perspectives. 
The present evolution of humanitarian law may be described as an evolution 
of terms. The term armed conflict, which for a long time was not considered very 
different from a war between States (whether formerly declared or factually 
started), has now more or less evolved in meaning vis,a,vis its international 
character. By far, most armed conflicts today are non, international. Very much 
to be deplored, this development has not led to a decrease in cruelty on the 
battlefield. The extent of suffering in non, international armed conflicts calls 
for an international response. The term humanitarian protection has undergone 
a similar development. It was first used to indicate protection granted by States, 
on issues limited by strict adherence to the principle of non' interference in the 
political affairs of other States. But there is hardly any objection today to 
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application of this term in a broader sense, including the right to intervene for 
humanitarian purposes against policy positions taken by other States. It also 
encompasses the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
even individuals, to ensure and strengthen human rights protection. This 
change inevitably leads to a new notion of international law, which is no longer 
confined to the conduct of States in their mutual relationships but now extends 
to individual human rights and to the global commitments of States not only to 
respect but also to ensure respect for the protection of victims of human rights 
violations. 
In 1899 and 1907 the Hague Peace Conferences took decisive steps, first by 
incorporating the obligation to issue instructions to the armed forces on the 
laws and customs of war on land (Article 1 of Hague Convention IV), and later 
by providing that a belligerent party which violates these regulations shall be 
responsible for all acts committed by its armed forces and liable to pay 
compensation (Article 3 of Hague Convention IV). 
After World War I there were but weak attempts to develop individual 
criminal responsibility under internationallaw.4 However, individual rights 
were stressed and developed in various domains. The concept of the protection 
of minorities, provided for in several peace treaties and special conventions 
connected therewith, generated a new attitude of conflict management in 
certain States which had either gained their independence or whose territory 
was otherwise affected by the results of the war. Although the great powers 
effectively rejected any effort to extend this protection to minorities in other 
States, the underlying legal principles influenced the Declaration on the 
International Rights of Man adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 
1929.5 The concept of self-determination, developed by President Woodrow 
Wilson, constituted the basis for the protection of non-self-governing 
territories under the League of Nations mandate system. For the first time, the 
protection of refugees under international law was implemented in a 
multinational framework. Last, but not least, the Geneva Conventions of 1929 
considerably improved the condition of the wounded and sick in armies in the 
field, as well as the treatment of prisoners of war. 
No effort was made at that time to enact individual responsibility of either 
political or military leaders or those executing orders. But acts of genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in World War II mobilized the 
international community to take at least the first steps to close this gap. The 
Genocide Convention of 1948 defined genocide as a crime under international 
law and introduced an obligation to try or extradite persons charged with this 
crime. It provides that competence rests with national tribunals of the State in 
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the territory of which the act was committed, or "such international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction" (Article VI). The obligation under the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 to punish or extradite persons who have 
committed grave breaches of humanitarian law was similarly based on the idea 
of national jurisdiction. The same applies to penal and disciplinary sanctions 
under Article 28 of the Cultural Property Convention of 1954. Nevertheless, 
these instruments effectively introduced the principle of individual 
responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity into conventional 
law, thus confirming the conclusion of the Nuremberg Tribunal that" [c]rimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and 
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced."6 
While the idea of indi'\jdual responsibility under international law has 
developed considerably during this century, there is still a reluctance to accept 
corresponding rights of the individual, rights based on international legal rules 
and given teeth by specific remedies against one's own, as well as foreign, 
States. Current State practice normally limits legal remedies to strict rules 
under existing nationanaw. Arguments based on international law are hardly. 
of importance to national jurisdiction. Where the question of remedies for 
violation of rights based on international law is raised, it is as a matter of 
principle not for the individual owner of such rights to take effective action, but 
rather the State of which he or she is a national. . 
The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 was one of the first international 
instruments to establish an individual right corresponding to the idea of 
individual responsibility. According to its Article 109, paragraph 3, no sick or 
injured prisoner of war may be repatriated against his will during hostilities. 
This right was further developed by the evolving practice of ensuring each 
prisoner of war the right to refuse repatriation at the end of an armed conflict, if 
he so chooses, and the right to have a private interview with an ICRC 
(International Committee of the Red Cross) official to confirm that his 
decision was made freely and without coercion. 
The 1977 Additional Protocols did not further develop those individual 
rights, except to provide fundamental legal guarantees to be granted within the 
relevant national system (Article 75 of Protocol I) and a right to refuse surgical 
operation (Article 11). In human rights conventions, however, a decisive step 
was taken to strengthen the rights of individual persons. The 1966 Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides 
that a State may recognize the competence of the Committee of Human Rights 
to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its 
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jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State of any of the 
rights enumerated in the Covenant, provided they have exhausted all available 
domestic remedies. likewise, the 1984 Torture Convention introduced the 
option for a State to accept the competence of the International Committee 
against Torture to investigate complaints by individuals falling under the 
jurisdiction of that particular State. 
Even in the absence of legal remedies, individuals may claim collective 
rights, e.g., the right of as confirmed in Article 1 (2) of the 
UN Charter and common Article 1 (1) of the 1966 Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. There is some 
sense, therefore, in assuming that respect for this right is an erga omnes 
obligation binding all States and owed to the international community as a 
whole. The right of cannot be limited to the peoples of 
existing States; otherwise, there would be no beyond a 
closed and often very arbitrary system which in itself provides the basis for 
demands for change. There is, however, no consensus on the present legal 
prerequisites for claiming a right of The liquidation of 
former European colonial regimes might be least controversial today. The 
United Nations has outlawed colonialism, and all relevant decisions can be 
effectively based on Chapters XI-XIII of the UN Charter. The right of 
may also be used to support efforts to restore sovereignty in 
territories where it has been illegally denied in recent times. In situations, 
however, which are characterized by neither colonialism nor illegal 
occupation, any recourse to the right of remains highly 
controversial. There is no right of separation from States. An 
exception to this rule may be the fact that serious human rights violations 
could generate a right of separation as a last resort.7 Consensus on this issue will 
remain difficult to achieve. It is no surprise that acceptance of the right of 
in the international community tends to increase 
proportionally with the distance from actual events. 
Within the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSeE) 
process, the significance of the human dimension was stressed by the third 
basket of the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975, and more specifically during 
the meetings held in 1989 (Vienna), 1990 (Copenhagen), and 1991 (Cracow, 
Geneva, and Moscow). It remains to be seen, however, whether this process 
may lead to the creation of new individual rights which go beyond a 
strengthening of existing commitments under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. The International Helsinki 
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Federation, in its 1997 Report, stated that human rights violations had been, 
and were still being, committed in thirty' two of the fifty,four oseE member 
States; yet, there is no effective international mechanism to examine such 
allegations or to ensure that appropriate remedies are available in the interest 
of the victims. 
In accordance with the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, any citizen of the European Union has a right to see the law 
determining his or her position respected by Community institutions, as well as 
member States.8 This right, and the corresponding remedies under European 
Union law, is comparable to national legal guarantees granted by a State to its 
citizens. Such guarantees cannot be expected to become part of global 
international law in the foreseeable future. 
In a recent systematic study of the rights and obligations of individuals as 
subjects of international humanitarian law, George Aldrich has assessed the 
existing individual criminal responsibility under international law for war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against peace, in the framework of possible 
individual rights corresponding to individual obligations.9 He very 
convincingly stresses that the latter are much less developed than the former. 
In this context, he has coined the term "imperfect right" to describe a situation 
where (1) legal rights of an individual have been violated, (2) the individual 
perpetrator is subject to criminal punishment as a result, and (3) the 
perpetrator, as well as his State, may at least theoretically be liable for damages. 
While individual remedies are available only in exceptional cases, individual 
claims remain widely dependent upon protection by the State concerned, and 
the latter is alone authorized to put such claims forward, or even waive them at 
the expense of those whose rights have been violated. 
The extent to which attempts to solve this situation are realistic is 
debatable. International cooperation is regularly developed without the 
benefits oflaw courts, without sanctions protecting the owner of specific rights 
against violations, and without a full,fledged system of reparations. Disputes 
can very often be settled only through negotiations on the basis of formal 
equality, without recourse to higher authorities. Where reparations can be 
achieved, they often tend to remain rather symbolic. 
Yet the role of legal arguments in such cooperation should not be 
underestimated. Legal positions are of importance, irrespective of the 
opportunity for enforcing their implementation. Even symbolic acts of 
reparation may have relevance for the participants as part of psychological or 
historical Vergangenheitsbewiiltigung. The dissuasive role oflegal reasoning may 
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add to the significance of such activities in avoiding possible claims as much as 
in settling existing ones. 
The evolution oflaw is a complex process, influenced by many players and 
dependent on various different sources. This is particularly true for 
international law, with all its imperfections. Efforts to overcome deficiencies in 
this area require patience and a good sense of proportion. It is in this spirit that 
existing gaps in existing international law ought to be assessed. 
Deficiencies of Existing Conventional Law 
At the present stage oflegal development, it is no longer possible, as a matter 
of positive law, to regard States as the only subjects of international law.1o 
However, there are a number of deficiencies which make it difficult for 
individuals either to exercise rights not deriving from their national legal 
system against their own State or to exercise rights against foreign States 
without the support of their own government acting on their behalf. 
The most important deficiency of international humanitarian law as laid 
down in existing conventions and agreements is its limited scope of 
applicability. Designed for armed conflicts of an international character, most 
of these rules do not formally apply to armed conflicts. In an 
effort to secure minimum rules in such conflicts, common Article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol II have underlined the 
legal difference between international and armed conflicts 
in a rather rudimentary way. If these provisions were understood as limiting 
legal protection in conflicts to an enumerative set of 
minimum rules, they would have to be considered as counterproductive in the 
interest of individual victims. Such a perception would be in strong 
contradiction to undeniable requirements of reality on the battlefield and 
would run counter to widely accepted principles of the rule of law. An 
excessively restrictive observance of the difference between international and 
armed conflicts in State practice would evidence a 
mentality unlikely to find any support in public opinion. There are but few 
armed forces, however, which have formally abolished such double standards 
by following an official policy of compliance with the full body of rules of 
international humanitarian law during conflicts.u 
Corresponding recommendations developed at the international level have 
not been implemented as widely as one would wishY The fact that such a 
policy serves not only humanitarian interests but also operational requirements 
has been stressed by expertsj13 nonetheless, widespread ignorance ofit remains. 
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Yet concrete results have never been fully investigated by legal and 
operational experts. The degree to which rules of international armed conflict 
are tailored to police,type operations in different levels of crisis during 
non,international conflicts may also be a matter of dispute. The use of the 
shotgun and tear gas, which must be seriously questioned during armed 
conflicts, was never prohibited for police operations, although the three 
general principles underlying the law of armed conflict are fully relevant to 
police operations: that the use of force is permissible only if it is directed against 
legitimate targets, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering, and perfidious 
acts are unlawful. The relevance of armed conflict law for military operations 
other than war needs to be studied in further detail. While interdisciplinary 
efforts to this effect would seem appropriate, and though the role of operational 
experts cannot be underestimated, it should not be overlooked that legal and 
policy considerations will often be decisive when balanced against factual and 
operational considerations. 
A further deficiency of international humanitarian law remains the large 
number of breaches of its existing rules. The problem is not unique to this field 
of law; it also applies to certain parts of national law, such as traffic law, 
taxation, customs, or environmental provisions. Though it would appear 
inappropriate to draw comparisons between these very different areas of legal 
regulation, one possible common conclusion may be that frequent violations 
do not necessarily amount to complete disregard of the law. Nevertheless, the 
need to further develop sanctions and foster dissemination of particular rules 
must be underlined. 
Objective fact,finding, so essential for effective law enforcement, is difficult 
to achieve. The Commission established under Article 90 of the 1977 Protocol 
I Additional to the Geneva Conventions to investigate allegations of serious 
violations of the Conventions and of the Protocol has not yet been given a 
single chance to provide its services. This is the case even though a growing 
number of States have recognized its competence and despite the fact that it is 
designed to work without publicity so as to avoid publicly offending States and 
to facilitate diplomatic solutions. There is no effective international 
jurisdiction at a global scale for adjudicating claims for violations of 
humanitarian law. The national jurisdiction of the author State is in many 
cases not sufficient. As far as the national jurisdiction of third States is 
concerned, the act of State doctrine still provides for sovereign immunity of the 
author State for acta iure imperii, with no exception for serious human rights 
violations. 
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Given this situation, the issue of whether claims brought before the courts of 
the author State may be based on national or international law is less relevant. 
It may be noted, however, that the German Federal Constitutional Court has 
held that no general rule of international law excludes individual claims for 
acts or omissions of a foreign State committed during a war. 14 The Court saw, in 
principle, parallel remedies for individuals and States, but it also underlined the 
fact that individual claims may be expressly excluded by peace treaties and 
similar treaties, such as the London Agreement on German External Debts of 
February 27, 1953.15 
Rights of the individual are decisively expressed by the manner and extent 
to which claims may be pursued; legal remedies to receive reparation (in terms 
of restitution or compensation) are still very imperfect. Full reparation can 
hardly be achieved in cases involving violations of humanitarian law. In this 
respect, pecuniary harm should not obscure the importance of reparation for 
emotional and moral damage. Legal restitution in terms of criminal sanctions 
had important psychological reparation effects for raped women in the former 
Yugoslavia, even where financial payments were impossible or unrealistic. The 
work of the Truth Commission in South Africa, which leads to a lump sum 
payment of no more than two thousand Rand (U.S. $400) to each of 
thousand victims of the apartheid regime, irrespective of the 
amount and degree of suffering, nevertheless has had the effect of restoring 
individual confidence in the rule oflaw in situations were adequate payment of 
damages is impossible or not expected. 
These few examples may suffice to support the thesis that no system of 
individual claims could be considered sufficient for systematic and massive 
violations of legal principles and rules. Even States trying in the most diligent 
manner to arrange for reparations have failed to cope with the extent of cruelty 
of which humankind is capable. 
The imperfect state of international humanitarian law implementation 
reflects a situation common to many areas of international law, one that may be 
best influenced by personal activities within governments, 
organizations, and by the public.16 This deficiency also offers opportunities for 
an active role by the individual, given that all implementation work depends 
on human activities at various levels of the State and on the willingness and 
ability of State officials to cooperate with organizations and 
private citizens. 
The role of individuals may also be affected by challenges to the law of 
neutrality during the present period of rapid development in the law. Both the 
Hague Peace Conferences prior to World War I and the development of the 
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Geneva Conventions are important examples of the role of neutral States in 
supporting the implementation and further development of humanitarian 
rules. The responsibility of neutral States to develop the law protecting 
individuals in the future is also evident. I? 
In failing States-which remain subjects of international law but, due to 
their lack of capacity to act, are exempt from responsibility under international 
law-even fundamental individual rights are unprotected. Failing States are 
characterized by total dissolution of order as a consequence of internal 
development and the absence of an effective negotiating partner the 
international community. Although direct criminal responsibility of 
individuals exists, and criminal jurisdiction can be exercised by third States and 
competent international tribunals, individual claims would appear unrealistic 
under such conditions.ls 
Considerations for International Law,Making 
It is particularly difficult to assess possibilities for 
in areas relating to military operations. States tend to stress the ad hoc 
significance of such operations. Even in cases in which military forces are 
operating in implementation of Security Council resolutions, it is not beyond 
dispute which body of law-that of armed conflict or law of peacetime 
operations-is properly applicable. This might explain the reluctance to 
acknowledge a need to develop further the rules, especially in a systematic 
manner. Furthermore, there are both general and specific obstacles to 
developing new conventional law in this area. Opinio iuris, a prerequisite for 
law creation (not only in the context of customary law), is only slowly, and 
often rather vaguely, shaped by public opinion and State practice. 
A cautious attitude towards conventional law creation is also suggested by 
recent developments. The most important example remains the experience 
with the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions. It took 
considerable time, despite the presence of the ICRC as an effective and 
professional promoter of that law, to establish the consensus necessary to reach 
the stage of signature in 1977, and even more so to carry the effort through to 
ratification (now in more than 140 States). In each case, ratification was based 
on national decisions, formally closed to international coordination-although 
nevertheless subject to a certain extent to outside influences. 
The lesson which may be gleaned from the 1980 Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons is not very different. Developed as a of the 
negotiations on the 1977 Protocols, the 1980 Convention was at first limited to 
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a prohibition of particular means and methods of combat that were of no 
distinct operational importance.19 The number of States parties to this 
Convention remained considerably low until the First Review Conference in 
1995 when the new Protocol N on Blinding Laser Weapons of October 13, 
1995, was added, a remarkable, although limited, step towards new 
conventional rules. The revision of Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Mines, Booby,Traps, and Other Devices on May 3, 1996, was an 
even more important second step, one supported by the international 
campaign against land mines. In this respect, the concerted efforts of many 
energetic players and the overwhelming evidence of excessive civilian 
casualties in more than a hundred States mobilized public opinion and soon led 
a considerable of governments to change their position as to the 
desirability and extent of a prohibition. At the same time, this exceptional 
campaign illustrated that the creation of conventional law is uncertain even in 
the face of overwhelming public expectations. Successful efforts to prohibit 
certain uses of anti,personnel land mines have not been accompanied in all 
quarters by equally effective efforts toward a prohibition of production, 
stockpiling, and sale. Thus, the new Convention on the Prohibition of 
Landmines, which was opened for signature in Ottawa on December 3, 1997, 
did not gain the same initial support as the revised Protocol II in 1996. 
Furthermore, individual rights have not been stipulated in this context; the 
issue, however, may well be taken up later. 
Political commitments and a policy of "soft law" implementation in some 
States may facilitate such trends. But they cannot substitute for a solid and 
often cumbersome process of creating conventional legal rules based on 
reciprocity, careful implementation of existing law, and the exercise of 
sanctions against breaches. 
The relevant UN policy is still uncertain in many respects. While individual 
human rights were first addressed in the Charter and international instruments 
developed under the auspices of the World Organization, many solutions have 
remained rather erratic. New legal provisions remain subject to the political 
will of governments. Proposals developed within the United Nations 
Secretariat have to cope with this reality. Yet the responsibility of, and 
opportunities for, the UN to influence legal perceptions by offering relevant 
information and developing appropriate proposals should not be 
underestimated; they should be given full support by the member States. 
An important example in this respect is the 1994 Convention on the Safety 
of United Nations and Associated Personnel. Efforts to prepare this new 
convention did not go as far as consolidating and codifying international rules 
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suggested by the Secretary-GeneraFo The Convention contains a few articles 
on certain fundamental obligp.tions of States, balanced by provisions on the 
relevant obligations of such personnel. The solution found is not free from gaps 
and uncertainties. It is based on a considerable misunderstanding that Article 
2(2) of the Convention excludes UN operations authorized by the Security 
Council as enforcement actions under Chapter VII "in which any of the 
personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to 
which the law of international armed conflict applies." Enforcement actions 
under Chapter VII should never be, and hence never be misinterpreted as, 
armed conflicts between the military forces involved. Rather, UN forces must 
be respected as enjoying immunity under Article 105 of the Charter and the 
general terms of the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations. Their members may not be taken as prisoners of war; in the 
event they are detained, it would be absurd to suggest they should not be 
released before "the cessation of active hostilities" in accordance with Article 
118(1) of the Third Geneva Convention, the accepted rule for combatants in 
armed conflicts. Thus, the 1994 Convention does not meet important 
requirements of peace enforcement which led to its development.21 
More successful, though considerably more controversial and time 
consuming, were efforts to establish the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
After several decades of discussion in various fora, this idea is now supported by 
the global consensus on the urgent need to establish the ad hoc tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. A conference of States will be 
convened in 1998 to prepare the legal basis of the ICC in more concrete terms 
than ever before. The competence of the ICC will be limited to acts of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and wars of aggression. Its 
jurisdiction will be subsidiary; only cases that cannot be adjudicated by 
national courts because they are unable or unwilling to restore justice shall be 
brought to the International Tribunal. In this context, the extent to which a 
State Party to the planned ICC Statute may have to modify its national laws 
(e.g., concerning extradition of nationals) remains to be clarifiedY 
Jurisdiction over command responsibility issues will remain a complex 
subjectP Major efforts will be required to introduce rules of procedure that 
are not included in the statute, subject to further experience of the ICC. In 
this respect, the development ofinternational rules of evidence will be of key 
importance.24 
Once established, the permanent International Criminal Tribunal will be a 
great step forward to ensuring the rule of law as a prerequisite for internal 
security, social stability, and peaceful development. It will support justice 
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where national judicial organs are failing. To build confidence on the part of 
the victims, to ensure legal balance, and avoid creating perceptions of victors' 
justice, a permanent international court is preferable to any ad hoc tribunal. 
The relationship between national and international jurisdiction should, 
however, be assessed in greater detail. Under what constraints should a State 
extradite its own nationals? Moreover, when should it extradite its own 
military personnel, who are subject to particular national order and discipline, 
and accountable to the highest political leadership? Are there limits to the ne 
bis in idem rule in cases where a national court has issued a sentence that at the 
international level might be considered too mild in comparison? How should 
cooperation between international and national judicial organs be developed? 
A thorough reassessment also appears to be necessary on the issue of 
individual claims. The ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, adopted in 
1996, did not mention the individual as a bearer of rights and obligations at 
all.25 Its Article 40 offers a very broad definition of the injured State, including 
even infringements of rights arising from a multilateral treaty or rules of 
customary international law in third States, anywhere on the globe, if it is 
established that "the right has been created or is established for the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Thus, human rights violations in 
any part of the world would allow any State to consider itself as injured and 
entitled under Article 42 of the draft "to obtain from the State which has 
committed an internationally wrongful act full reparation in the form of 
restitution in kind, compensation, satisfaction and assurances and guarantees 
of either singly or in combination." Hardly any State, however, 
will defend claims of citizens of third States. If the individual victim himself 
could put claims forward against the author State and base his claim on 
international law rather than the national law of that State, reparations might 
be more effective. 
An excellent example of an expert proposal compiled in international 
cooperation to support lawmaking by States is the revised set of Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law prepared by Theo van 
Boven as Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Z6 It 
starts from the principle that every State has the duty to respect, and to ensure 
respect for, human rights and humanitarian law. This obligation includes the 
duty to prevent violations, investigate violations, take appropriate action 
against violators, and afford remedies and reparation to victims. As stipulated 
by the Special Rapporteur, every State shall ensure that adequate legal or other 
appropriate remedies are available to any person claiming that his or her rights 
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have been violated. Reparation may be claimed by the direct victims or their 
immediate family. It includes restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction, and guarantees of Restitution, which is designed 
to reestablish the situation that existed prior to the violations, shall include 
restoration ofliberty, family life, citizenship, return to one's place of residence, 
and use of property. Compensation shall be provided for any pecuniarily 
assessable damage resulting from violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law, such as physical or mental harm, (including pain, suffering, and emotional 
distress) and lost opportunities (including education, material damages, and 
loss of earnings-including in turn loss of earning potential, harm to reputation 
or dignity, and costs required for legal or expert assistance). Rehabilitation 
shall be provided, and it will include medical and psychological care as well as 
legal and social services. Satisfaction and guarantees of shall be 
provided, including, as necessary, cessation of continuing violations, 
verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth; an official 
declaration or a judicial deciSion restoring the dignity, reputation, and legal 
rights of the persons connected with the victim; an apology, including public 
acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility; judicial or 
administrative sanctions against persons responsible for the violations; 
commemorations and tributes to the victims; inclusion in human rights 
training and in history textbooks of an accurate account of the violations 
committed in the field of human rights and humanitarian law; and preventing 
the recurrence of violations-by such means as ensuring effective civilian 
control of military and security forces, restricting the jurisdiction of military 
tribunals to only specifically military offenses committed by members of the 
armed forces, strengthening the independence of the judiciary, protecting the 
legal profeSSion and human rights defenders, and improving, on a priority basis, 
human rights training for all sectors of society, in particular for military and 
security forces, as well as for law enforcement officials. 
Acceptance of these draft principles and guidelines would progressively 
develop existing international law, which is still very far from providing full 
reparations in favor of individuals. In most situations, the right to reparation 
still rests \vithin municipal legal orders; there are no other means of 
enforcement except under national law. 
International judicial mechanisms developed under the European and the 
American Conventions on Human Rights will hardly gain more than regional 
importance in this respect, although the interlinked mechanism of the 
European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, which 
allows for a certain degree of individual complaint against infringements of 
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fundamental freedoms, has been recommended as a model for other areas.27 Of 
practical significance could be the relevant UN procedures in fora such as the 
United Nations Claims Commission (UNCC). In this respect, however, more 
experience still has to be collected. In addition to the fact that practice remains 
to be developed in administering funds on behalf of UN organs, State practice 
remains decisive for legal development. This practice will be influenced, but 
not exclusively governed, by general principles as shaped in legal writings over 
the centuries.28 There is still no comprehensive concept of reparations in cases 
of breach of humanitarian law. Practical solutions remain rudimentary, and it 
must be admitted that full reparation can hardly be expected in any case, even 
those involving grave breaches of the law. 
Considering the issue in more general terms, and maybe in a longer time 
frame, however, allows for an overall picture in which legal principles are of clear 
relevance. The Martens clause, shaped into conventional law at the First Hague 
Peace Conference in 1899 and reaffirmed in the 1977 Additional Protocols to 
the Geneva Conventions, has been used to close legal lacunae and develop 
appropriate principles and rules in cases not covered by existing conventional 
law. Its reference to established custom, the principles of humanity, and the 
dictates of public conscience has provided arguments that have been seen as 
describing underlying principles for legal provisions and rules of conduct for 
States and international organizations. The relevance of these provisions and 
rules for legal and policy decisions has never been seriously disputed. The role of 
the media and its influence for international decision making has been very often 
enhanced by principles and attitudes which enjoy support in various quarters, 
even among people who disagree on many daily political issues. Backed by 
professional international institutions such as the ICRC, by relevant NGOs, and 
by academia, such principles are part of the process oflaw creation today, even in 
areas where there were different, or even no, rules at an earlier stage. This may 
lead to an application onegal rules developed for other purposes, in cases that 
had previously been considered quite different. 
Lawmaking by analogy is not a new idea. Lawyers tend to draw arguments 
from comparable situations, cases, and legal regulations. Vattel was convinced 
that the rules of the natural law of nations can be derived by analogy from the 
natural law of manj29 the opposite was, however, never common consensus. 
Rules of the law of nations have only limited influence on internal law. The 
differences in the responsibilities and interests involved are too great. 
Individuals can hardly compare their interests with group interests. It would be 
inappropriate to compare individuals with Statesj it may even remain an open 
question whether or not it is in the best interest of the individual to develop 
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rights (and duties) under international law independently from rights and 
duties of his or her home State. Yet individuals need protection against States, 
a requirement which is not limited to the relationship with their own State. 
This is so because today considerable ties, expanding in quantity and quality, 
exist between States and nationals of other States, requiring both sides to 
observe rules towards each other and making it necessary for individuals to 
claim rights on their own behalf without recourse to support from their home 
State. There is an evolving custom and indeed a developing legal opinio to 
prove the existence of such rights.30 
This process has also affected the role of the individual in the development 
oflaw, its possible influence on decision making, and the interpretation of rules 
and their implementation. There are but rare exceptions to the principle that 
rules of international law are created by States and not by private individuals. 
But it should be remembered that States act through individual men and 
women as their representatives. These representatives are not only bound by 
instructions in performing their particular mission, but they very often actively 
develop positions that are approved by their superiors, even accepted without 
further deliberation. As are all individuals, government experts are subject to 
outside influences in a complex personal process of decision making. This is 
well accepted even by traditional law. The sources of international law 
enumerated in Article 38, paragraph 1 (a-c), of the Statute of the International 
Court of} ustice reveal a certain role of the individual in the lawmaking process. 
Treaties and contracts may be concluded between States or international 
organizations and foreign private law persons. Customary law and general 
principles oflaw are based on man,made arguments, subject to confirmation by 
State practice. As subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
international law, Article 38, paragraph l(d), expressly refers not only to 
judicial decisions but also to "the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations." The present information age may lead to a 
considerable increase in the influence of a large number of such persons. At the 
same time, the transparency of available information may also support 
mainstream trends in arguments and consideration of relevant State practice. 
Thus this development often contributes to practice,oriented, and less 
extravagant, results. 
Conclusions 
Even if the present assessment remains incomplete in various respects and is 
subject to further developments, there can be no doubt of the fact that 
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individuals clearly have an active role to playas bearers of individual rights and 
obligations under international humanitarian law, or that individuals acting for 
States, international organizations, or even on their own enjoy considerable 
opportunity to participate in the development of that law. 
The many factors of human decision making require an interdisciplinary 
approach, one which includes ethical, cultural, technological, economic, and 
operational considerations. A complete assessment must be based on an array 
of different aspects. There is no guarantee, however, that objective criteria will 
be observed. Rather, the importance of policy constraints suggests that the 
degree to which particular aspects will be taken into due consideration and 
weighed against other aspects and requirements is undergoing rapid 
development. The role of legal advisors in this complex process of decision 
making is a delicate one. Weighing different interests exposes him or her to 
blame for Wishful thinking; sticking to the more technical task of interpreting 
existing rules and provisions would offer less than might be rightly expected. 
Lawyers should stress the importance of policy constraints on military 
operations. It is their task to balance the rights and obligations of the operators 
in the field to ensure that they are fully informed about the relevant legal 
framework and that they fully use existing opportunities. This advisory task, 
however, has to be performed with a sense of proportion as regards the methods 
to be applied and the objective to be sought. It would be wrong to see the legal 
advisor solely in the role of post factum defender of the operator. Rather, he has 
to involve himself in the decision,making process, influence target selection, 
accept full responsibility for his advice, and develop the courage to dissuade 
others from excessive plans. 
As Rosalyn Higgins has suggested, international law is a process of 
authoritative decision making, not just the neutral application of rules.31 This 
is especially true for rules of armed conflict law, which are based on policy 
considerations derived from the principle of distinction between civilian 
objects and military objectives, the avoidance of unnecessary suffering or 
superfluous injury, and the prohibition of acts of perfidy. The whole body of 
humanitarian law in armed conflicts is to be understood as a process of 
respecting and implementing these few principles. It is not a fixed set of bright 
line rules which can be applied irrespective of the factual context. To use 
Rosalyn Higgins's words, none of the problems explored can be satisfactorily 
resolved by confident invocation of a "correct rule." 
It is interesting to speculate how Admiral Stockton would have reacted to 
some of the modem challenges described in this contribution. He would 
probably have developed arguments and positions different from those he 
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chose in his time. But he would surely have done so with an attitude very 
similar to that for which he was well known by his contemporaries. Practical 
assessments, professionalism, and legal passion might have led him to personal 
initiatives in support of both national interests and the protection of the rights 
of individuals. 
It should be stressed that none of the many issues to be raised in this context 
can be solved without international cooperation. The existence of 
international rights and obligations depends on acceptance by more than one 
State. It is therefore not enough to draw on a particular national legal system. 
Rather, it is the international environment of individual action that also 
influences the legal assessment in a given context. 
Results in this continuing process will remain as incomplete and imperfect as 
nearly everything else in legal development. It remains difficult to make 
convincing assessments except in retrospect. effects often remain 
obscure, and anticipating objections which may arise at a later stage is risky by 
any standard. Thus developing humanitarian law remains as much a challenge 
for individual actors as for States and organizations authorizing, sponsoring, or 
supporting this task. 
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